CASE ANALYSIS
“Progress of any society depends on its ability to protect rights of women”
On October 15, 2020 a three-judge bench of Justices Ashok Bhushan, R. Subhash Reddy and MR Shah held that a wife is also entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household belonging to relatives of the husband. This is an important ruling overturning the previous Apex Court’s decision in S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra in 2006.
In S.R. Batra vs Taruna Batra 2007 3 SCC 169, the Supreme Court bench of Justices SB Sinha and Markandey Katju had rejected the contention that the definition of shared household includes a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage had lived in a domestic relationship. It held that the wife is only entitled to claim a right to residence in a shared household, and a shared household would only mean the house belonging to or taken on rent by the husband, or the house which belongs to the joint family of which the husband is a member under section 2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. The court had further observed that claim for alternative accommodation can only be made against the husband and not against the husband’s in-laws or other relatives.
But now in Satish Chander Ahuja Vs. Sneha Ahuja (Civ App. No. 2483 of 2020), this 3 judge bench observed the definition of ‘shared household’ given in Section 2(s) of the Act cannot be read to mean that it can only be that household which is household of the joint family of which husband is a member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share. The court said that “In the event, shared household belongs to any relative of the husband with whom in a domestic relationship the woman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) are satisfied and the said house will become a shared household.”
FACTS OF THE CASE
Satish Chander Ahuja filed a suit against his daughter in law for mandatory and permanent injunction and also for recovery of damages. He alleged that the property belonged to him and neither his son nor his daughter-in-law Sneha, have any ownership rights over it and it led to passing of an order asking the woman to vacate the premises by the Trial Court. The husband had filed a separate case for decree of divorce against his wife and the woman had filed a criminal complaint under the domestic violence law against the husband, Mr. Ahuja and the mother-in-law. The Delhi High Court had set aside an order of a trial court passed in 2019 asking the daughter-in-law to vacate his premises. The High Court had also passed several directions and asked the civil court to decide the lawsuit afresh. Eventually he appealed to the Apex Court placed reliance on Batra judgment of 2006 and that the premises is not a shared household since the husband neither has any share in the suit premises nor suit premises is a joint family property.
ISSUES AND DECISIONS
So, the court was confronted with the following issues:
1) Whether the definition of shared household under Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 has to be read to mean that shared household can only be that household which is household of joint family or in which husband of the aggrieved person has a share?
Section 2(s) lays down that “shared household means a household where the person aggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent and includes such a household whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interest or equity and includes such a household which may belong to the joint family of which the respondent is a member, irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household.” The phrase lives or at any stage has lived in a domestic relationship in section 2(s) has to be given a purposeful and normal meaning, opined the Bench. They observed that “From the above definition, following is clear:- (i) it is not requirement of law that aggrieved person may either own the premises jointly or singly or by tenanting it jointly or singly; (ii) the household may belong to a joint family of which the respondent is a member irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest in the shared household; and (iii) the shared household may either be owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.”
On the first issue, the court emphasized on the permanency of a woman inhabiting a house for security and that the purpose of the legislators behind the Domestic violence act was to safeguard the interests of women. “The living of woman in a household has to refer to a living which has some permanency. Mere fleeting or casual living at different places shall not make a shared household. The intention of the parties and the nature of living including the nature of household have to be looked into to find out as to whether the parties intended to treat the premises as shared household or not. As noted above, Act 2005 was enacted to give a higher right in favour of woman. The Act, 2005 has been enacted to provide for more effective protection of the rights of the woman who are victims of violence of any kind occurring within the family. The Act has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of Act, 2005 grants an entitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence under the shared household irrespective of her having any legal interest in the same or not.”, noted the court.
2) Whether or not the judgment in S.R. Batra and Anr. Vs. Taruna Batra has correctly interpreted the provision of Section 2(s) of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
On the second issue, the court said that, “The observation of this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra that definition of shared household in Section 2(s) is not very happily worded and it has to be interpreted, which is sensible and does not lead to chaos in the society also does not commend us. The definition of shared household is clear and exhaustive definition as observed by us. The object and purpose of the Act was to grant a right to aggrieved person, a woman of residence in shared household. The interpretation which is put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra if accepted shall clearly frustrate the object and purpose of the Act. The court thus, was of the opinion that the interpretation of definition of shared household as put by this Court in S.R. Batra Vs. Taruna Batra is not correct interpretation and the said judgment does not lay down the correct law.”
3)Whether the High Court has rightly come to the conclusion that suit filed by the appellant could not have been decreed under Order XII Rule 6 CPC?
4)Whether, when the defendant in her written statement pleaded that suit property is her shared household and she has right to residence therein, the Trial Court could have decreed the suit of the plaintiff without deciding such claim of defendant which was permissible to be decided as per Section 26 of the Act, 2005?
It is observed by the Court that, on examination of the facts and circumstances, the court has to exercise its judicial discretion keeping in mind that a judgment on admission is a judgment without trial which permanently denies any remedy to the defendant by way of an appeal on merits. It is further observed that, therefore, unless the admission is clear, unambiguous and unconditional, the discretion of the Court should 84 not be exercised to deny the valuable right of a defendant to contest the claim. In short, the discretion should be used only when there is a clear “admission” which can be acted upon. It is further observed and held that “admission” should be categorical. It should be a conscious and deliberate act of the party making it, showing an intention to be bound by it. The power under Order XII Rule 6 is discretionary and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. In the facts of the present case, the Trial Court ought not to have given judgment under Order XII Rule 6 on the admission of the defendant as contained in her application filed under Section 12 of the D.V. Act. 97 Thus, there are more than one reason for not approving the course of action adopted by Trial Court in passing the judgment under Order XII Rule 6. The court thus, concured with the view of the High Court that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court given under Order XII rule 6 is unsustainable.
Section 26 of the 2005 Act has to be interpreted in a manner to effectuate the very purpose and object of the Act. Unless the determination of claim by an aggrieved person seeking any order as contemplated by the 2005 95 Act is expressly barred from consideration by a civil court, this Court shall be loath to read in bar in consideration of any such claim in any legal proceeding before the civil court. When the proceeding initiated by the plaintiff in the Judge, Small Cause Court alleged termination of gratuitous licence of the appellant and prays for restraining the appellant from using the suit flat and permit the plaintiff to enter and use the flat, the right of residence as claimed by the appellant is interconnected with such determination and refusal of consideration of claim of the appellant as raised in her counterclaim shall be nothing but denying consideration of claim as contemplated by Section 26 of the 2005 Act which shall lead to multiplicity of proceedings, which cannot be the object and purpose of the 2005 Act. Thus the court was of the considered opinion that the counterclaim filed by the appellant before Judge, Small Cause Court in Civil Suit No. 77 of 2013 was fully entertainable and the courts below committed error in refusing to consider such claim.” In view of the ratio laid down by court in the above case, the claim of the defendant that suit property is shared household and she has right to reside in the house ought to have been considered by the Trial Court and non-consideration of the 96 claim/defence is nothing but defeating the right, which is protected by Act, 2005.
5)Whether the plaintiff in the suit giving rise to this appeal can be said to be the respondent as per definition of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005 ?
The court was of the view that for the purposes of determination of right of defendant under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 in the suit in question the plaintiff can be treated as “respondent”, but for the grant of any relief to the defendant or for successful resisting the suit of the plaintiff necessary conditions for grant of relief as prescribed under the Act, 2005 has to be pleaded and proved by the defendant, only then the relief can be granted by the Civil Court to the defendant.
6)What is the meaning and extent of the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law” as occurring in Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 ?
The court was of the opinion that the expression “save in accordance with the procedure established by law”, in Section 17(2) of the Act, 2005 contemplates the proceedings in court of competent jurisdiction. Thus, suit for mandatory and permanent injunction/eviction or possession by the owner of the property is maintainable before a Competent Court. The court further noticed that in sub-section (2) the injunction is “shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household save in accordance with procedure established by law”. Thus, the provision itself contemplates adopting of any procedure established by law by the respondent for eviction or exclusion of the aggrieved person from the shared household. Thus, in appropriate case, the competent court can decide the claim in a properly 113 instituted suit by the owner as to whether the women need to be excluded or evicted from the shared household. One most common example for eviction and exclusion may be when the aggrieved person is provided same level of alternate accommodation or payment of rent as contemplated by Section 19 sub-section (f) itself. There may be cases where plaintiff can successfully prove before the Competent Court that the claim of plaintiff for eviction of respondent is accepted. There is no need to ponder for cases and circumstances where eviction or exclusion can be allowed or refused. It depends on facts of each case for which no further discussion is necessary in the facts of the present case. The High Court in the impugned judgment has also expressed opinion that suit filed by the plaintiff cannot be held to be non maintainable with which conclusion the court was in agreement.
In case, the shared household of a woman is a tenanted/allotted/licensed accommodation where tenancy/ allotment/license is in the name of husband, father-in-law or any other relative, the Act, 2005 does not operate against the landlord/lessor/licensor in initiating an appropriate proceedings for eviction of the tenant/allottee/licensee qua the shared household. However, in case the proceedings are due to any collusion between the two, the woman, who is living in the shared household has right to resist the proceedings on all grounds which the tenant/lessee/licensee could have taken in the proceedings. The embargo under Section 17(2) of Act, 2005 of not to be evicted or excluded save in accordance with the procedure established by law operates only against the “respondent”, i.e., one who is respondent within the meaning of Section 2(q) of Act, 2005.
7)Whether the husband of aggrieved party (defendant) is necessary party in the suit filed by the plaintiff against the defendant?
The court held that in the present case, although plaintiff has not claimed any relief against his son, Raveen Ahuja, the husband of the respondent, hence, he was not a necessary party but in view of the fact that respondent has pleaded her right of residence in shared household relying on Sections 17 and 19 of the Act, 2005 and one of the rights which can be granted under Section 19 is right of alternate accommodation, the husband is a proper party. The right of maintenance as per the provisions of Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 is that of the husband, hence he may be a proper party in cases when the Court is to consider the claim of respondent under Sections 17 and 19 read with Section 26 of the Act, 2005. Civil Procedure Code, Order I Rule 10 empowers the Court at any stage of the proceedings either on an application or suo moto to add a party either as plaintiff or defendant, whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectively and completely adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit. Hence the court held that the husband of the defendant was not a necessary party but in view of the pleadings in the written statement, the husband was a proper party.
8)What is the effect of orders passed under Section 19 of the Act, 2005 whether interim or final passed in the proceedings initiated in a civil court of competent jurisdiction?
From the above discussions, the court arrived at following conclusions:-
- The pendency of proceedings under Act, 2005 or any order interim or final passed under D.V. Act under Section 19 regarding right of residence is not an embargo for initiating or continuing any civil proceedings, which relate to the subject matter of order interim or final passed in proceedings under D.V. Act, 2005.
- The judgment or order of criminal court granting an interim or final relief under Section 19 of D.V. Act, 2005 are relevant 150 within the meaning of Section 43 of the Evidence Act and can be referred to and looked into by the civil court.
- civil court is to determine the issues in civil proceedings on the basis of evidence, which has been led by the parties before the civil court.
- in the facts of the present case, suit filed in civil court for mandatory and permanent injunction was fully maintainable and the issues raised by the appellant as well as by the defendant claiming a right under Section 19 were to be addressed and decided on the basis of evidence, which is led by the parties in the suit.
Recognizing the historical abuse faced by women in India, the court relied on the significance of equal status for them while comprehending the reasons for domestic laws in place. It noted that “The progress of any society depends on its ability to protect and promote the rights of its women. Guaranteeing equal rights and privileges to women by the Constitution of India had marked the step towards the transformation of the status of the women in this country.”
They admitted how women mould into different roles in the society and are expected to perform subserviently to the males. “The domestic violence in this country is rampant and several women encounter violence in some form or the other or almost every day, however, it is the least reported form of cruel behaviour. A woman resigns her fate to the never-ending cycle of enduring violence and discrimination as a daughter, a sister, a wife, a mother, a partner or a single woman in her lifetime. This non-retaliation by women coupled with the absence of laws addressing women’s issues, ignorance of the existing laws enacted for women and societal attitude makes the women vulnerable. The reason why most cases of domestic violence are never reported is due to the social stigma of the society and the attitude of the women themselves, where women are expected to be subservient, not just to their male counterparts but also to the male’s relatives.”
The court also remarked that the 2005 Act of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence was a milestone in protection of women in the country!
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